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Abstract—We show that duals of certain low-density parity-
check (LDPC) codes, when used in a standard coset coding
scheme, provide strong secrecy over the binary erasure wiretap
channel (BEWC). This result hinges on a stopping set analysis of
ensembles of LDPC codes with block length n and girth ≥ 2k,
for some k ≥ 2. We show that if the minimum left degree of
the ensemble is lmin, the expected probability of block error is
O( 1
ndlmink/2e−k
) when the erasure probability  < ef , where ef
depends on the degree distribution of the ensemble. As long as
lmin > 2 and k > 2, the dual of this LDPC code provides strong
secrecy over a BEWC of erasure probability greater than 1−ef .
I. INTRODUCTION
The information-theoretic limits of secure communications
over public channels were first investigated by Shannon [1];
given a message M and its corresponding cryptogram Xn of
length n, a message is communicated with perfect secrecy
if I(M;Xn) = 0. Shannon proved the disappointing result
that perfect secrecy requires a secret key K with entropy
H(K) ≥ H(M). In this setting, Wyner subsequently proposed
an alternative model for secure communication called a wire-
tap channel [2], in which all communications occur over noisy
channels and the eavesdropper observes a degraded version
Zn of the signal received by the legitimate receiver. Wyner
introduced the notion of weak secrecy, which requires the
leaked information rate 1n I(M;Z
n) to vanish as n→∞, and
established the weak secrecy capacity, that is the maximum
secure communication rate achievable over a wiretap channel
under this condition. Maurer and Wolf later highlighted the
shortcomings of weak secrecy for cryptographic purposes, and
suggested to replace it with the notion of strong secrecy, by
which the absolute information I(M;Zn) should vanish as
n → ∞. Surprisingly, this stronger secrecy requirement does
not reduce secrecy capacity [3], [4].
Despite the surge of recent results investigating wiretap
channels, the design of coding schemes with provable secrecy
rate has not attracted much attention. Some efforts in coding
for wiretap channels include [5]–[9].
In this work, we revisit the LDPC-based coset coding
scheme of [7] for the binary erasure wiretap channel. We
first show that the dual of randomly generated LDPC codes
can achieve strong secrecy provided the probability of block
error of the LDPC codes decays faster than 1n with the block
length n in a binary erasure channel. Then, we show that for
certain small-cycle-free LDPC ensembles, the probability of
block error under iterative decoding decays as O( 1n2 ). We
obtain this result by analyzing the stopping sets of LDPC
ensembles. Stopping sets [10], [11] determine whether iterative
decoding of LDPC codes under erasures will succeed or not.
Asymptotic enumeration of stopping sets has been done by
several authors (see [12]–[15] and references thereof). We
follow the approach in [12], where asymptotics of the average
block error probability of LDPC codes were derived.
Ensembles of LDPC codes with better than 1n average
block error probability are known from prior studies which
use expander-based ideas and stopping set expurgation [16],
[17]. Expander-based ideas typically require minimum bit
node degree of five or above resulting in a decrease in
thresholds. Expurgation of stopping sets is usually more dif-
ficult to achieve than expurgation of short cycles in random
constructions. In our approach, we consider ensembles with
finite girth. Restricting the girth results in O( 1n2 ) expected
block error probability in irregular ensembles with minimum
girth 4 and minimum bit node degree 3. This enables high
erasure thresholds and efficient construction methods.
In this work, the code construction for strong secrecy is
fundamentally different from Maurer and Wolf’s procedure
to obtain strong secrecy from weak secrecy [3]. Maurer and
Wolf’s method relies on the equivalence of key-generation
with one-way communication and coding for the wiretap
channel, while our code construction yields a forward error-
control scheme directly. Nevertheless, the constraint imposed
in our code construction limits the achievable secrecy rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we briefly review the coset coding scheme for the binary
erasure wiretap channel and establish the connection between
strong secrecy and the decay of probability of block error
with code length. In Section III, we show that the probability
of block error for ensembles without short cycles decays fast
enough to guarantee strong secrecy.
II. SECRECY CODING FOR THE BINARY ERASURE
WIRETAP CHANNEL
The wiretap channel considered in this work, denoted by
BEWC(), is illustrated in Fig. 1. The channel between the
legitimate parties is noiseless while the eavesdropper’s channel
is a binary erasure channel with erasure probability  (denoted
BEC()). The secrecy capacity of this wiretap channel is Cs =
 [2].
The “coset coding” scheme to communicate secretly over
this channel, proposed in [6], is the following. Prior to
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Fig. 1. Binary erasure wiretap channel.
transmission, Alice and Bob agree on a (n, n − k) code C
with parity check matrix H. The coset of C with syndrome
sk is denoted by C(sk) = {xn ∈ {0, 1}n : sk = HTxn}. To
transmit a message M of k bits, Alice transmits a codeword
Xn chosen uniformly at random in C(M). Bob decodes his
received codeword Xn by forming the syndrome HTXn.
The following theorem due to Ozarow and Wyner connects
the equivocation of the eavesdropper to algebraic properties of
the generator matrix.
Theorem 1 ( [6]). Let C be a (n, n−k) code with generator
matrix G = [g1, . . . , gn], where gi represents the i-th column
of G. Let zn be an observation of the eavesdropper with µ
unerased position given by {i : zi 6=?} = {i1, . . . , iµ}. Let
Gµ = [gi1 . . . giµ ]. Then, H(M|zn) = k iff Gµ has full rank.
Based on Theorem 1, we can now connect the rate of
convergence of I(M;Zn) to the probability that a submatrix
of G has full rank.
Lemma 1. Let Gµ be the submatrix of G corresponding to
the unerased positions in Zn. Let pnf be the probability that
Gµ is not full rank. Then, a coset coding scheme operates with
strong secrecy if the probability pnf is such that pnf = O( 1nα )
for some α > 1.
Proof: We can lower bound H(M|Zn) as
H(M|Zn) ≥ H(M|Zn, rank(Gµ))
≥ H(M|Zn, Gµ is full rank)P[Gµ is full rank]
= k(1− pnf ) = k −Rsnpnf
If pnf = O( 1nα ), then I(M;Zn) = k−H(M|Zn) ≤ O( 1nα−1 ),
which can be made arbitrary small for n sufficiently large and
α > 1.
Let Cn(λ, ρ) be an LDPC ensemble with n variable nodes,
left edge degree distributions λ(x) =
∑
i≥1 λix
i−1 and right
node degree distribution ρ(x) =
∑
i≥1 ρix
i−1 [15, §3.4]
with possibly some expurgations. The degree distributions
λ(x), ρ(x) are from an edge perspective, that is λi is the
fraction of edges connected to a variable node of degree i
and ρj is similarly defined.
Let P (n)e () denote the probability of block error for codes
from Cn(λ, ρ) over BEC() under iterative decoding. An im-
portant interpretation of P (n)e () is the following: for a parity-
check matrix H with degree distribution (λ, ρ), 1 − P (n)e ()
is a lower bound on the probability that erased columns of
weak
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Fig. 2. Weak and strong secrecy regions using duals of LDPC codes
H (over a BEC()) form a full-rank submatrix. Using this
interpretation and results from [7], we have the following
immediate corollary of Lemma 1.
Corollary 1. If there exists ∗ > 0 such that P (n)e () =
O( 1nα ), (α > 1) for  < ∗, then the dual of a code
from Cn(λ, ρ) used in a coset coding scheme provides strong
secrecy over a BEWC() for  > 1− ∗.
It is immediately clear that we will have ∗ ≤ th, where
th is the erasure threshold for the ensemble over LDPC codes
[15]. As noted in [7], when  ≤ th we have weak secrecy. In
view of this, we will have guaranteed weak and strong secrecy
regions as illustrated in Fig. 2 by doing “coset coding” using
duals of LDPC codes. We know that degree distributions can
be optimized so that 1 − th is very close to the code rate.
Since LDPC codes achieve capacity over a BEC, our coding
scheme will achieve weak secrecy very close to the secrecy
rate and strong secrecy slightly away from the secrecy rate. In
the next section, we will show that ∗ exists for some restricted
ensembles of LDPC codes.
III. THE LDPC ENSEMBLE WITHOUT SHORT CYCLES
In this section, we study the sub-ensemble of Tanner graphs
[15] whose girth is at least 2k for some integer k ≥ 2
which does not change with the block length n. We denote
the ensemble of all Tanner graphs by G(n, λ, ρ) and the sub-
ensemble of girth ≥ g graphs by Gg(n, λ, ρ). We associate i
sockets to each node of degree i. An edge in a Tanner graph
is an unordered pair containing one bit node socket and one
check node socket. A Tanner graph with |E| edges has |E|
sockets on each side. Therefore, the size of the ensemble equal
to the number of permutation of the check node sockets, which
is |E|!. First we show that the size of our sub-ensemble is not
negligible compared to the size of the original ensemble as
n→∞.
Lemma 2 ( [18, Corollary 4]). Let n, g be even positive
integers and d ≥ 3 be an integer. As n grows, let (d−1)2g−1 =
o(n). Then, the number of (labeled) d-regular bipartite graphs
on n vertices with girth greater than g is
(nd/2)!
(d!)n
exp
− g/2∑
s=1
(d− 1)2s
2s
+ o(1)

as n→∞.
Note that the number of d-regular bipartite graphs on n
vertices is (nd/2)!/(d!)n. The following corollary is then
immediate.
Corollary 2. Let g, n be positive even numbers and let d ≥ 3
be an integer. Let d, g remain constant as n → ∞. Then,
the fraction of (d, d) regular bipartite graphs that have girth
greater than g is
exp
− g/2∑
s=1
(d− 1)2s
2s
+ o(1)

as n→∞. In particular, this fraction is bounded away from
zero for large n.
Lemma 3. Let a (λ, ρ) irregular Tanner graph ensemble be
such that max{deg(λ),deg(ρ)} > 2 and the coefficients of the
degree distribution polynomials are rational. Let g > 0 be an
integer that remains constant with block length n. There exists
an increasing sequence (nk) of positive integers such that the
fraction of graphs of girth > g in G(nk, λ, ρ) is bounded away
from zero as k →∞.
Proof: Let d be the least common multiple of all the
vertex degrees in the graph. Clearly, d > 2 and it is a function
of only λ and ρ. Let a be the smallest positive integer such
that
aλ˜i
d ,
aρ˜j
d ∈ N
where λ˜i is the fraction of variable nodes of degree i and ρ˜j
is the fraction of check nodes of degree j [15, §3.4]. Consider
the Tanner graph ensemble with nk = ak variable nodes.
We can group d/i of the degree i variable nodes to get one
variable node of degree d. If we do this for all the variable
node degrees, we will have a left regular Tanner graph with
left degree d. Similarly, we can repeat this process for the
check nodes to get a (d, d) regular Tanner graph. Note that in
this node grouping process, we preserve the number of edges
since the ensemble allows the possibility of multiple edges.
The girth of the resultant regular graph is not more than that
of the original graph. It can also be noted that there is a one-
one correspondence between the graphs in the (λ, ρ) ensemble
and those in the (d, d) ensemble. By lemma 2, the fraction of
graphs with girth > g in the (d, d) ensemble, say µ, is non-
zero if k is large enough. So, the fraction of graphs in the
(λ, ρ) ensemble with girth > g is at least µ. This proves the
lemma.
Remark 1. Let X be a graph dependent positive number.
Let EX represent the expectation of X over G(n, λ, ρ). Let
E1X be the expectation over Gg(n, λ, ρ) and E2X be the
expectation over G(n, λ, ρ) \ Gg(n, λ, ρ). We have
EX = qnE1X + (1− qn)E2X
where qn , |Gg(n, λ, ρ)|/|G(n, λ, ρ)|. By lemma 3, there exists
a p > 0 such that for large n, we have qn ≥ p. Therefore,
EX ≥ pE1X
E1X ≤ 1
p
EX
This inequality is used to upper bound E1X when it is easier
to find an upper bound to EX .
A. Stopping sets and stopping number
For the sake of clarity and completeness, we restate some
of the definitions that were originally stated in [12]. Given a
Tanner graph G, let U be any subset of variable nodes in G.
Let the (check node) neighbours of U be denoted by N(U).
U is called a stopping set if the degree of all the check nodes
in the induced subgraph G[U ∪ N(U)] is at least two. The
stopping number of a Tanner graph is defined as the size of its
smallest stopping set. For a given Tanner graph, its stopping
number is denoted by s∗ and the set of all stopping sets is
denoted by S. The stopping ratio is defined as the ratio of the
stopping number to the block length.
The average stopping set distribution is defined as
E(s) = E(|{S ∈ S : |S| = s}|)
where the average is taken over all the Tanner graphs in
G(n, ρ, λ). For any rational α ∈ [0, 1], it is assumed that there
exists a sequence (nk) of strictly increasing block lengths such
that E(αnk) > 0 for all nk. We can then define the normalized
stopping set distribution as
γ(α) = lim
k→∞
1
nk
logE(αnk)
It was shown that γ(α) is continuous over the set of rationals
and hence, it can be extended to a continuous function over
[0, 1]. The critical exponent stopping ratio of a Tanner graph
ensemble is defined as
α∗ = inf{α > 0 : γ(α) ≥ 0}
B. Block error probability of short-cycle-free ensembles
In this section, we prove a key result about the average block
error probability of short-cycle-free LDPC ensembles, which
is central to our claim that the duals of these codes provide
strong secrecy. Let P ITB (C, ) be the probability of block error
when the code C is transmitted over BEC() and iteratively
decoded. We define [12]
ef , sup
{
 : max
α∈[0,]
(
γ(α) + (1− α)h( −α1−α )− h()
)
≤ 0
}
where h(x) is the binary entropy function calculated using
natural logarithms. Note that γ(α), and ef are calculated over
the entire ensemble G(n, λ, ρ) instead of the girth-restricted
ensemble. Instead of calculating P ITB (C, ) directly, we take
averages of this quantity over an ensemble of codes and show
that the average block error probability over the ensemble
G2k(n, λ, ρ) decays as fast as we want it to for  < ef .
Theorem 2. For G2k(n, λ, ρ), with minimum variable node
degree lmin, maximum variable node degree lmax and maxi-
mum check node degree rmax > 2 we have
E1(P ITB (C, )) = O
(
1
nd
lmin
2 ke−k
)
and in the limits of small  and large n
E1(P ITB (C, )) = O
(
k
nd
lmin
2 ke−k
)
Proof: Let Ve be the set of variable nodes corresponding
to the random erasures in the LDPC codeword. The iterative
decoding fails iff Ve contains a stopping set. So,
P ITB (C, ) = P(∃S ∈ S : S ⊂ Ve)
For any δ1, δ2 > 0, we bound P ITB (C, ) using union bound
as
P ITB (C, ) ≤
δ1n−1∑
i=k
|{S ∈ S : |S| = i}| i
+ P(∃S ∈ S : S ⊂ Ve, δ1n ≤ |S| ≤ (+ δ2)n)
+ P(∃S ∈ S : S ⊂ Ve, (+ δ2)n ≤ |S| ≤ n)
Using an argument almost identical to the one used in [12,
Theorem 16], we can show that the expectations of the second
and the third terms go to zero exponentially as n → ∞ if
 < ef. Now,
E1
(
δ1n−1∑
i=k
|{S ∈ S : |S| = i}| i
)
=
δ1n−1∑
i=k
E1 (|{S ∈ S : |S| = i}|) i
≤ 1
p
δ1n−1∑
i=k
E (|{S ∈ S : |S| = i}|) i
A stopping set of i variable nodes can have nodes of
different degrees. Let Si denote the set of all non-negative
integer solutions to the equation ilmin+ilmin+1+· · ·+ilmax = i.
We can write
E (|{S ∈ S : |S| = i}|) i
= i
∑
{is}∈Si
(nλ˜lmin
ilmin
)(nλ˜lmin+1
ilmin+1
) · · · (nλ˜lmaxilmax ) A( |E|∑
sis
)
≤ i
(
n
i
) ∑
{is}∈Si
A( |E|∑
sis
)
Here, A is the number of ways to connect the selected i vari-
able nodes to form a stopping set. This number is independent
of n as long as i is just a small fraction of it. We also note
that if we increase the degree of all the check nodes in the
graph, A can only increase. Therefore, we may upper bound A
by the number of ways to form a stopping set assuming each
check node has the maximum possible degree, rmax. The latter
number is equal to coef
(
((1 + x)rmax − rmaxx)m , x
∑
sis
)
by
elementary combinatorics. We have,
A ≤ coef
(
((1 + x)rmax − rmaxx)m , x
∑
sis
)
≤
(
m+ b
∑
sis
2 c − d
∑
sis
rmax
e
b
∑
sis
2 c
)
(2rmax − 3)
∑
sis
where the last inequality follows from [12, Lemma 18]. If we
denote
∑
sis by w, we have ilmin ≤ w ≤ ilmax. So,
E (|{S ∈ S : |S| = i}|) i
≤ i
(
n
i
) ∑
{is}∈Si
(
m+ bw2 c − d wrmax e
bw2 c
)
(2rmax − 3)w(|E|
w
)
≤ i
(
n
i
)
(2rmax − 3)ilmax
∑
{is}∈Si
(
m+ ilmax2
bw2 c
)
1(|E|
w
)
≤ i
(
n
i
)
(2rmax − 3)ilmax
∑
{is}∈Si
(
m+ ilmax2
)bw2 c w!
bw2 c! (|E| − ilmax)w
If we denote the summand by f(w), we have
f(2r+1)
f(2r) =
2r+1
|E|−ilmax ≤ ilmax|E|−ilmax ≤ δnlmax|E|−δ1nlmax ≤ 1
if we choose δ1 small enough. Also,
f(2r+2)
f(2r+1) = 2
m+
ilmax
2
|E|−ilmax ≤ 2
m+
δ1nlmax
2
|E|−δ1nlmax
Since rmax > 2 we have |E| > 2m. Again, if we choose δ1
small enough, we will have f(2r + 2)/f(2r + 1) ≤ 1. So,
f(w) is a non-increasing function and w ≥ ilmin. We now
have
E (|{S ∈ S : |S| = i}|) i
≤ i(ni)(2rmax − 3)ilmax
×
∑
{is}∈Si
(
m+ ilmax2
)b ilmin2 c (ilmin)!
b ilmin2 c! (|E| − ilmax)ilmin
≤ i(ni)(2rmax − 3)ilmax(i+ 1)rmax
×
(
m+ δ1nlmax2
)b ilmin2 c (ilmin)!
b ilmin2 c! (|E| − δ1nlmax)ilmin
≤ i(ni)(2rmax − 3)ilmax (i+ 1)rmax
nd
ilmin
2 e
×
(
r0 +
δ1rmax
2
)b ilmin2 c (ilmin)!
b ilmin2 c! (r1 − δ1rmax)ilmin
, iJi
Here, r0 = m/n and r1 = |E|/n depend only on ρ and λ. If
i remains a constant as n→∞, we have
Ji = Θ
(
1
nd
ilmin
2 e−i
)
(1)
Also,
Ji+2
Ji
=
(
n
i+2
)(
n
i
) (2rmax − 3)2lmax (r0 + δ1lmax2 )lmin
(r1 − δ1lmax)2lmin
×
(
i+3
i+1
)rmax (ilmin + 2lmin)!b ilmin2 c!
(ilmin)!
(b ilmin2 c+ lmin)!nlmin
≤ (n− i− 1)(n− i)
(i+ 1)(i+ 2)
(2rmax − 3)2lmax
(
i+3
i+1
)rmax
× (r0 +
δ1lmax
2 )
lmin
(r1 − δ1lmax)2lmin
(ilmin + 2lmin)
2lmin(b ilmin2 c+ 1)lmin nlmin
Using i+3i+1 ≤ 2, ilmin + 2lmin ≤ 3ilmin, bxc+ 1 ≥ x,
Ji+2
Ji
≤ n
2
i2
(2rmax − 3)2lmax2rmax
(r0 +
δ1lmax
2 )
lmin
(r1 − δ1lmax)2lmin
× (3ilmin)
2lmin(
ilmin
2
)lmin
nlmin
Choosing δ3 ∈ (0, 1) such that r1 − δ3lmax > 0 and δ1 < δ3,
Ji+2
Ji
≤ (2rmax − 3)2lmax2rmax
× (r0 +
δ3lmax
2 )
lmin(3lmin)
2lmin
(r1 − δ3lmax)2lmin
(
lmin
2
)lmin
(
i
n
)lmin−2
= B
(
i
n
)lmin−2
≤ Bδlmin−21
where B depends only on λ and ρ.
E1
(
δ1n−1∑
i=k
|{S ∈ S : |S| = i}| i
)
≤ 1
p
δ1n−1∑
i=k
iJi
≤ 1
p
k
δ1n−1∑
i=k
Ji
=
1
p
k
[
Θ
(
1
nd
lmin
2 ke−k
)
+ Θ
(
1
nd
lmin
2 (k+1)e−k−1
)]
×
δ1n/2∑
i=0
(
Bδlmin−21
)i
If δ1 is small enough, then the summation in the above
equation is bounded by a decreasing geometric sum. So,
E1
(
δ1n−1∑
i=k
|{S ∈ S : |S| = i}| i
)
= O
(
k
nd
lmin
2 ke−k
)
⇒ E1
(
P ITB (C, )
)
= O
(
k
nd
lmin
2 ke−k
)
(2)
as → 0 and n→∞.
From the above theorem, the average block error probability
in our ensemble decays faster than 1n2 for lmin > 2 and k > 3.
This correpsonds to LDPC ensembles with a minimum bit
node degree of at least 3 and girth at least 4. By corollary 1,
the duals of these LDPC codes achieve strong secrecy over a
BEWC of erasure probability 1− ef .
The (3, 6) regular LDPC ensemble has th = 0.429,
ef = 0.366 and rate 1/2. When duals of codes in this
ensemble are used on BEWC(), a secret communication rate
of 0.5 is achieved with weak secrecy when  ∈ (0.571, 0.634)
and with strong secrecy when  > 0.634. Our numerical
calculations indicate that some of the degree distributions that
are optimized for very high th have ef < 0.366.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this work, we have shown that duals of LDPC codes
with girth greater than 4 and minimum left degree at least 3
achieve strong secrecy on the binary erasure wiretap channel.
LDPC ensembles with degree 2 nodes play an important role
in achieving capacity on the binary erasure channel. Further
study is required on the relationship between these LDPC
codes and strong secrecy. Another research possibility involves
optimizing the degree distributions to find LDPC ensembles
with a very high ef for a given rate.
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